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DESIGN, TRADING, AND INNOVATION
David M Driesen
Proponents of “economic incentives” frequently state that emissions trading promotes
technological innovation.1 Emissions trading programs authorize polluters to meet pollution
reduction obligations by purchasing extra reductions from polluters reducing their emissions
below applicable limits. This Article examines the claim that this trading of compliance
obligations fosters innovation. This claim relies upon an error in economic theory,2 which many
economists and lawyers have repeated,3 and on insufficiently analyzed, incomplete anecdotal
observation.4 There are solid reasons to suspect that an emissions trading program does a poorer
job of stimulating innovation than a comparably designed traditional regulation.5 But much
depends upon design details.

1

See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 <BI>Col. J. Envtl. L.<D> 171, 183 (1988);
Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13
<BI>Col J. Envtl. L.<D> 217, 234-235 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, IncentiveBased Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea, 18 <BI>Ecology L. Q.<D> 1, 13
(1991); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13
<BI>Colum. J. Envtl. L.<D> 153, 160 (1988); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Global
Climate Change: How Can Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 <BI>U. Chi. Legal
F.<D> 293, 302-03.
2

See David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New
Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 <BI>J. Env’t Econ. & Man.<D> 52 (1987) (pointing out the
error and offering a correction).
3

See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological Change, 22
<BI>Envt’l & Resource Econ.<D> 41, 51 (2002) (economic incentives stimulate innovation by
paying firms to clean up “a bit more”); Stewart, supra note 1, at 160 (“economic incentives
provide enterprises with ongoing incentives to devise new . . . technologies to further reduce
pollution”). As we shall see, I do not claim that these statements are false, but that they are so
radically incomplete and misleading as to constitute a theoretical error.
4

See, e.g., Byron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, 14 <BI>Envtl. F.<D>, May-June 1997, at 17
(describing fuel switching and use of scrubbers as innovations from the acid rain program).
5

See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 <BI>Wash. & Lee L.
Rev.<D> 289, 313-322, 325-338 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, Dichotomy]; David M. Driesen,
Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26
<BI>Bost. Coll Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.<D> 1, (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, Cheap Fix].
2

In theory, government can require all polluters to purchase allowances from a limited
supply at an auction.6 Whether or not polluters can trade allowances, this requirement that all
polluters purchase allowances for each ton of pollution can create incentives to innovate and
reduce pollution. This Article, however, focuses on emissions trading programs that give away
limited allowances for free, and then authorize trades to redistribute them. I choose this approach
because all existing United States pollution trading programs give away, rather than sell, the
overwhelming majority of allowances,7 and because this focus sharpens analysis of trading’s
effect on innovation.
Defining Innovation
I define innovation as something new. Newness, however, means something more than “it
has not been done” before by a particular company or even industry. A company with no
environmental controls may adopt standard, well-established techniques used in the past by their
competitors or by another industry. This normally involves technological diffusion, not
technological innovation.
Innovation implies a non-obvious departure from prior practice. Innovation in this sense
advances the state of the art. As we shall see, innovation defined in this manner has special value.
The Importance of Innovation
Innovation can perform one of two basic functions. It can lower the cost of a product or
increase its quality.8 Computers with word processing programs, for example, cost much more
than pen and paper or a typewriter, but offer a much higher quality writing aid, making revision
relatively easy.9
So too with environmental innovation.10 Innovation can reduce the cost of pollution

6

See Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 <BI>Yale
L. J.<D> 2707, 2715-2721 (1991) (arguing for the superiority of an auction based system). The
acid rain program authorizes direct sales and auctioning of a tiny fraction of the available
allowances. See 42 U.S.C. §7651o.
7

See 42 U.S.C. §§7651c(e), 7651d (giving away almost all allowances). Cf. 42 U.S.C.
§7651o (authorizing the sale and auction of very limited numbers of allowances). I am not aware
of any other U.S. trading program that requires purchase of allowances from the government.
8

<BI>David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law<D> 78-80
(MIT Press 2003).
9

Id. at 79.

10

For a definition of environmental innovation, see id. at 77-78. Cf. Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 <BI>Cal. L.
3

control or make it possible to perform basic economic functions with less pollution than existing
approaches.11 In other words, environmental innovation can either offer qualitatively better
environmental results or reduce the cost of achieving a particular result.
In a new book, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law, I argue that this former
“qualitative” function has immense importance.12 We suffer from continued air pollution
problems and worsening climate change largely because we remain addicted to very old basic
technologies such as coal-fired power plants and gasoline-burning car engines.13 Pollution from
cars and power plants bears a major portion of the responsibility for tens of thousands of annual
deaths from air pollution, millions of cases of asthma, cancer risks, reproductive toxicity risk,
widespread destruction of ecosystems, and global climate change (which may produce rising
seas, a spread of infectious diseases, eco-system harms, and, in places, drought and starvation).14
We need to change current technologies drastically if we hope to address these problems
comprehensively in the economically dynamic world we live in--a dynamic world of growing
population, increased consumption, and fierce lobbying fueled by the proceeds of increased
consumption.15 This economic dynamic tends to make environmental problems grow over time.16
This dynamic almost always undermines some of the progress environmental regulation would

Rev.<D> 1256, 1279 (1981) (distinguishing between market and social innovation).
11

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 81.

12

See id. at 85-89.

13

See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to Replace
Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 32 ELR 10277, 10280, 10284 (Mar. 2002)
(detailing contributions to air pollution from vehicles and power plants and the persistence of
outmoded technologies); <BI>Environmental Law Institute (ELI), Cleaner Power: The Benefits
and Costs of Moving from Coal Generation to Modern Power Technologies<D> (2001).
14

See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 13, at 10277-10280 (discussing air
pollution’s affects and fossil fuel combustion’s contribution to air pollution); <BI>Climate
Change 2001: Synthesis Report<D> 9-12 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2001); <BI>The
Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerabilities<D> 5 -7 (Robert T.
Watson et al. eds., 1998); <BI>Lynne T. Edgerton, The Rising Tide: Global Warming and World
Sea Levels<D> (1991).
15

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 114, 123-125 (discussing
population growth and lobbying by regulated industry); Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra
note 13, at 10285-19286 (discussing benefits of changing basic power plant and vehicle
technologies); <BI>ELI, Cleaner Power<D>, supra note 13 (discussing costs and benefits of
moving from coal-fired power production).
16

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 123-126.
4

otherwise bring about, and, at times, leads to absolute declines in environmental quality.17
Technological innovation also performs an important political function--making progress
possible where it otherwise could not occur.18 The climate change regime, for example, assumes
that the richer countries will develop and share the technologies that will make it possible for
relatively poor countries to enjoy a good quality of life and contribute to efforts to address
climate change.19 Absent this sort of developed country leadership, developed countries may
have great difficulty persuading tomorrow’s greatest greenhouse gas emitters, such as China and
India, to reduce emissions to tolerable levels.20
We need to reframe the environmental policy debate around the question of addressing
the economic dynamics of environmental law.21 This involves, among other things, asking how
we can design environmental law that stimulates environmental innovation as effectively as we
currently stimulate material innovation (some of which is environmentally destructive).22 In any
case, environmental policy analysts generally agree upon the desirability of stimulating
technological innovation to improve the environment.23
Emissions trading has been widely implemented.24 Hence, the question of whether it
17

See id. at 123.

18

See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets,
80 <BI>Tex. L. Rev.<D> 531, 541 (2002) (innovation can ease “the way for broader
environmental improvements.”). Cf. Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 54-55 (noting that cost-saving
innovation may make optimal environmental policy more stringent).
19

See Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 15.

20

See id. at 50; Deborah E. Cooper, Note, The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global
Warming’s Sleeping Giant, 11 <BI>Geo. Int’l L. Rev.<D> 401, 429 & n.202 (1999) (citing a
Chinese official’s statement that the United States is shirking its climate change responsibilities
to support the statement that China has objected to additional responsibilities for developing
nations); <BI>Joyeeta Gupta, The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From
Conflict to Consensus<D> 129 n.41 (1997).
21

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 10-11, 215.

22

See id. at 12, 183-201.

23

See e.g. Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 49.

24

See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 291-92. See e.g. Royal C. Gardner, Banking
on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 <BI>Iowa L. Rev.<D> 527
(1996) (reviewing an intertemporal trading program for wetlands conservation); David M.
Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 <BI>Ecology L.
Q.<D> 263 (2000) (discussing international application of emissions trading); Ann Powers,
Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading, 23
5

encourages innovation matters a great deal.
The Theoretical Error
Imagine an argument against emissions trading’s capacity to stimulate innovation that
went like this: In an emissions trading program, some polluters emit more than their allowable
emissions; therefore, these polluters have less of an incentive to innovate than they would have
under a traditional program and emissions trading decreases incentives to innovate.
This argument is wrong. Why?
Well, emissions trading does provide an incentive for some polluters to emit more than
they would under a traditional regulation.25 But those polluters must pay other polluters to make
extra emission reductions to make up the gap.26 Resting a model of emissions trading upon the
experience of only half of the polluters (the buyers of credits) in the market is obviously wrong.
This model leaves the sellers of emission credits, who make extra reductions to sell to the buyers,
out of the picture. It is obviously incomplete.
Now, let’s make an equally wrong argument for the other position. The argument would
go like this: Polluters have an incentive to make extra emission reductions under emissions
trading so that they can sell credits;27 therefore, emissions trading stimulates innovation.
This model accurately explains the situation of sellers of credits. But it is also obviously
incomplete. It leaves the buyers of credits out of the picture. While emissions trading encourages
sellers to decrease emissions below the levels a comparable traditional regulation, trading
encourages buyers to increase their emissions above what a traditional regulation allows.
The seller-based model, incomplete as it is, actually forms the theoretical predicate for the
standard argument that emissions trading encourages innovation.28 Many economists, legal
scholars, and practicing lawyers repeat this obviously incomplete argument over and over again
as gospel.29

<BI>Colum. J. Envtl. L.<D> 137 (1998) (discussing proposal to use nitrogen trading regionally
to control water pollution).
25

See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 334; Suzi Kerr & Richard Newell, PolicyInduced Technology Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown, 3 (Resources for the
Future Discussion Paper 01-14, 2001) (relatively high-cost plants will have decreased incentives
to adopt technology under a trading system).
26

See id.

27

See Malueg, supra note 2, at 8-9 & n.33.

28

See id.

29

See e.g. Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 51 (“market-based instruments can provide
powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control technologies . . .
6

Basing an economic model only upon the seller’s decrease of emissions amounts to
treating emissions trading as a program that generates extra net emission reductions. If emissions
trading did that, obviously it would create a greater net incentive for innovation. For stricter
regulation demands more than laxer regulation and, therefore, heightens incentives for
innovation. But an emissions trading does not generate more net emissions reductions than a
comparable traditional regulation. A perfectly functioning trading program will generate the
same reductions as a comparable traditional regulation.
If the market functions perfectly, then an emissions trading program produces precisely
the same amount of reductions that a traditional regulation with the same emission limits would
produce, no more and no less.30 Emissions trading shifts emission reductions, concentrating the
same number of reductions among the facilities with the lowest pollution reduction costs.31 The
right question is whether this shift of reductions from high-cost to low-cost facilities encourages
innovation.
Claiming that emissions trading provides individual facilities an incentive absent from
traditional regulation--the incentive to produce credits for sale--does not save the argument that
emissions trading is superior in stimulating innovation. For emissions trading decreases
incentives present in traditional regulation--the incentive for high-cost facilities to innovate in
order to save money. Economists have no real explanation why a measure that reduces
innovation incentives for some facilities and increases them for others will lead to an increase in
overall levels of innovation among facilities subject to a regulation. And the relevant question for
public policy, of course, must address overall levels of innovation, not just of a chosen subset of
facilities.
In 1987, David Malueg, now of Tulane University’s economics department, wrote an
article in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management discussing the
incompleteness of the seller-based model.32 He argued that an economic model of emissions
trading must recognize that some polluters make more reductions under a trading regime than
they would under a traditional regulation, and some polluters make less.33 This argument seems
irrefutable. Indeed, the desire of some polluters to avoid otherwise required reductions generates
the demand for “extra” emission decreases that drives emissions trading. In a real sense, emission
increases (above otherwise required levels) finance emission decreases in an emissions trading

because . . . with market-based instruments, it pays firms to clean up a bit more . . . ).
30

See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 8-9 & n.33 (describing trading’s tendency to seek
equilibrium. See generally <BI>J.H. Dales, Pollution Property and Prices<D> 92-100 (1968).
31

See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 334; Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 43.

32

See Malueg, supra note 2.

33

See id. at 54-56.
7

program.34 For the savings realized by not making expensive reductions at buyers’ own facilities
finance the purchase of credits that drives the market.35
Amazingly, the economics literature does not refute Malueg’s model or defend the
incomplete model most economists have selected. While sophisticated analysts recognize that
Malueg’s model casts doubt on the thesis that emissions trading without auctioned allowances
encourages innovation,36 many articles continue to give a reasonably complete model short shrift
while basing conclusions on an obviously incomplete model.37 Worse, the selection of a seller-

34

See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 337.

35

See id.

36

Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 334 (employing the Malueg model); <BI>David
Wallace, Environmental Policy and Industrial Innovation: Strategies in Europe, the U.S.A., and
Japan<D> 20 (1995) (explaining that Malueg’s “more sophisticated model” casts doubt on the
claim that emissions trading necessarily spurs innovation); Malloy, supra note 18, at 543 n.33
(discussing Malueg as suggesting that emissions trading may cause a decrease in research and
development in pollution reducing technology); Kerr & Newell, supra note 25, at 3 (employing
the Malueg model as part of a very sophisticated analysis of the lead trading program); Hahn &
Stavins, supra note 1, at 8-9 n.33 (pointing out, consistent with Malueg, that trading encourages
abatement by some sources, while encouraging high cost sources to increase emissions); Robert
P. Anex, Stimulating Innovation in Green Technology: Policy Alternatives and Opportunities, 44
<BI>Am. Behav. Scientist<C> 188, 201 (2002) (market incentives do not necessarily improve
incentives for innovation; Chuhlo Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 <BI>J. Envtl. Econ.
& Mgmt.<D> 95, 95 (1996) (“marketable permits may not provide greater incentives than
standards, because the incentive effects of marketable permits depend on whether firms are
buyers and sellers.”); V. Kerry Smith & Randy Walsh, Do Painless Environmental Policies
Exist?, 21 <BI>J. Risk & Uncertainty<D> 73, 75-76 (2000) (addressing the Malueg model);
Michael Grubb & David Ulph, Energy, the Environment, and Innovation, 18 <BI>Oxford Rev.
Econ. Pol’y<D> 92, 104 (2002) (expressing lack of confidence in environmental policy’s ability
to encourage innovation without a technology policy). See also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean
Tirole, Pollution Permits and Environmental Innovation, 62 <BI>J. Pub. Econ.<D> 127, 128
(1996) (permits can create “inefficiencies with regard to innovation”).
37

See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 51 (stating that economic incentives pay firms to
“clean up a bit more”, but not mentioning that emissions trading pays others not to clean up).
Hahn & Stavins, writing in the Ecology Law Quarterly, state that emissions trading encourages
innovation by paying firms for additional cleanup. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 13. In a
footnote they cite Malueg for the proposition that trading may reduce traditional incentives for
abatement “under certain circumstances.” Id. n.70. See also Eran Feitelson, An Alternative Role
for Economic Instruments: Sustainable Future for Environmental Management, 16 <BI>Envtl.
Mgmt.<D> 299, 301 (1992) (Malueg has “shown that trading permits do not provide in all cases
8

based model is systematically biased toward the position that emissions trading encourages
innovation, just as the selection of a buyer-based model would be systematically biased toward
the conclusion that emissions trading discourages innovation.
The Theoretical Case Against Emissions Trading as a Stimulator of Innovation
A rudimentary understanding of emissions trading shows that it will disfavor costly
innovation. Emissions trading creates an incentive for a polluter facing high control cost to
purchase credits that cost less than the cost of control at the buyer’s facility.38 Furthermore, the
buyer has an incentive to purchase the cheapest credits possible. Knowing this, rational sellers
will only generate credits that cost less to produce than: 1) the control cost of prospective buyers;
and 2) credits with which the seller must compete.
This rules out the purchase of credits generated by relatively expensive innovation. But
that raises the question of whether expensive innovation is desirable. In answering that question,
we should bear in mind that useful innovations often follow a path where they cost a lot at the
outset, but the costs of using innovations fall as producers learn better production techniques and
realize savings through economies of scale.39 Thus, an expensive innovation might function as an
investment in future cheap reductions.40 The emissions trading market does not encourage such
investments because the buyer of credits chooses the cheapest current reductions, not considering
societal cost savings in the future.41
Furthermore, some expensive innovations offer a qualitative improvement that makes

a superior incentive for pollution control innovations”). But Malueg’s claim applies to all trading
programs that give away allowances (i.e., just about all of the extant programs), not just “certain
circumstances.” It’s not an exception to some general rule, it is the rule.
38

See Malloy, supra note 18, at 542-543; Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 42 (buyers
will purchase cheap credits).
39

See, e.g., Julie Edelson Halpert, Harnessing the Sun and Selling it Abroad: U.S. Solar
Industry in Export Boom, <BI>N.Y. Times<D>, June 5, 1996, at D1; Adam B. Jaffe et al.,
Technological Change and the Environment, in <BI>The Handbook of Environmental
Economics<D> 33 (Jeffrey Vincent ed., 2003) (forthcoming) (discussing economic models
predicated upon falling abatement costs from “learning by doing”); <BI>Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), Acting as the Preparatory Committee for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, Energy, and Transport: Report of the Secretary General<D>, at 4,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2001/PC/20 (2000) (price of solar photovoltaic modules has come down
about 25%).
40

See, e.g., <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 83-85.

41

See, e.g., Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 44.
9

them quite worthwhile, even if they do cost more.42 Thus, for example, a technology that
produces a whole raft of environmental benefits may prove valuable even if it does not offer the
cheapest current method of obtaining the benefit sought by a targeted emissions trading program.
Innovations that decrease reliance upon fossil fuels offer both this qualitative superiority
and the possibility of future cost savings. Renewable energy technologies have experienced rapid
declines in prices as production has increased, even though they have never achieved the scale
that might facilitate really enormous reductions in price.43 And renewable technologies promise
relief not just from a particular air pollutant, but from a host of pollutants, associated destruction
of land from drilling and mining, water pollution, and much else besides.44 Yet, emissions trading
tends to favor low-cost solutions, like better scrubbers and catalysts, to environmentally and
economically superior solutions for the long haul.
While the case against emissions trading as a method to stimulate expensive but
potentially invaluable environmental innovation seems simple, irrefutable, and very strong, the
question of whether it provides superior incentives for cost reducing innovation is more
complex.45 I now turn to that question.
Emissions trading creates two sets of incentives. It creates weaker incentives for
innovation from buyers of credits than a comparable traditional regulation, encouraging the buyer
to forego reductions and innovation at her facility.46 On the other hand, it creates stronger
incentives for sellers of credits to innovate, encouraging them to make extra emission reductions
at their facilities (in order to sell credits). The difficult and appropriate question is whether this
spatial shift of reductions increases or decreases net innovation.
In theory, emissions trading probably weakens net incentives for innovation.47 If a
regulation allows facilities to use trading to meet standards, then the low-cost facilities will tend
to provide more of the total reductions than they would provide under a comparable traditional

42

See, e.g., <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 85-86

43

See, e.g., CSD, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing declines in prices of solar photovoltaic
modules); James McVeigh et al., Winner, Loser, or Innocent Victim?: Has Renewable Energy
Performed as Expected (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 99-28, 1999).
44

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 34-35.

45

In fact, the case is not completely iron clad. The lead trading case may demonstrate that
notwithstanding the drag trading may place on innovation, sufficiently stringent limits will force
innovation if they cannot be met without it. If one reduces pollution to zero, innovation often
must take place. While trading can retard the pace of innovation, as it did in the lead case, it will
not prevent it. See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 317 n.131.
46

See Kerr & Newell, supra note 25, at 3 (buyers have decreased incentives for
technological adoption).
47

Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 42.
10

regulation.48 Conversely, the high-cost facilities will tend to provide less of the total required
reductions than they would under a comparable traditional regulation.49 One would expect the
low-cost facilities to have a greater ability to provide reductions without substantial innovation
than the high-cost facility.50 A high-cost facility may need to innovate to escape the high costs of
routine compliance; the low-cost facility may have less of a need for this.51 The induced
innovation hypothesis, widely employed by economists, suggests that high costs will spur, not
deter, innovation.52 So lowering the cost of routine compliance, through trading or otherwise,
does not encourage innovation. Trading, by shifting reductions from high-cost to low-cost
facilities, may lessen the net incentives for innovation.53
High local control costs often serve as the catalyst for innovation. Companies do not
routinely pursue all innovations.54 Investigation of innovation often involves substantial
investment without certainty about pay-off.55 Many companies’ management structures further
discourage environmental innovation because environmental projects must compete with other
more favored projects for company resources needed to investigate and implement the
innovation.56 When companies face either the impossibility of compliance without innovation or
very high control costs, however, the environmental compliance division acquires some
bargaining power to secure resources to investigate innovation.57 Absent such incentives,
companies will tend to comply or over-comply through application of routine technology.
Some analysis of the low emissions vehicle (LEV) program, a regulatory program that

48

Id. at 43.

49

Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 334.

50

Id.

51

Id.; Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 5, at 42-43.

52

See Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving
Technological Change, 114 <BI>Q. J. Econ.<D> 941 (1999). Cf. Malloy, supra note 18, at 546
(linking the induced innovation idea to the idea that traditional regulation may induce innovation)
53

Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 335.

54

See Malloy, supra note 18, at 537-38, 556.

55

See id. at 557; Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 44 (discussing how uncertainties can lead to
insufficient investment in innovation).
56

See Malloy, supra note 18, at 567-586 (describing various forms of competition for
resources within firms),
57

See id. at 550 (discussing how very stringent regulation leaves the firm with little
choice but to innovate).
11

several states have enacted to stimulate innovation and secure emission reductions from
automobiles, illustrates the way emissions trading may decrease incentives for innovation.58 The
program requires introduction of a fairly large number of vehicles that must meet emission
standards that car manufacturers can realize with fairly modest technological improvements, such
as introduction of very efficient catalysts.59 But the program also requires introduction of a small
number of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), most likely electric cars.60 The automobile industry
claims that the ZEVs will prove expensive to produce. One could, in theory, design a program
that provides the same net emission reductions as the LEV program by requiring more
widespread implementation of the emission reduction requirements other than the zero emissions
mandate as the basis for a trading program.61 In the short run at least, this would produce, in
theory, the same emission reductions for less cost. But the zero emissions mandate provides the
incentive to develop new technologies that may revolutionize the environmental performance of
automobiles over time and even lower long-term costs.62 Hence, there is a tradeoff between the
short term efficiency that emissions trading promotes and the desire to promote environmentally
superior technological innovation.
Another example comes from joint implementation, an international emissions trading

58

See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.
2000) (discussing California’s recission of prior zero emission vehicle (ZEV) mandate and
negotiation of a memorandum of understanding creating an informal ZEV mandate); American
Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d
1397, 1412 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York have adopted
the LEV program); American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Commissioner, 31 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1994)
(upholding Massachusetts LEV program); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v.
New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding New
York LEV program).
59

See Studies Will Examine Effects of Sulfur on Catalysts in Low Emission Vehicles, 28
Envt. Rep. (BNA) 403 (June 27, 1997).
60

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of some of the technological
issues, see <BI>James J. Mackenzie, The Keys to the Car: Electric and Hydrogen Vehicles for
the 21st Century<D> (1994).
61

In practice, one could not do so with any integrity. Measurement of the mass of
automobile emissions is notoriously difficult, especially “evaporative emissions.” ZEVs will
virtually eliminate evaporative emissions as well as tailpipe emissions.
62

See generally <BI>Michael Shnayerson, The Car That Could: The Inside Story of
GM’s Revolutionary Electric Vehicle<D> (1996) (detailing innovations and the role of the ZEV
mandate in stimulating them).
12

program proposed as a means of meeting climate change goals.63 The United States has
sponsored pilot projects to demonstrate the feasibility of allowing electric utilities, significant
sources of greenhouse gases, to claim credits undertaken abroad as a substitute for making
reductions below current levels at home. If instead the United States imposed strict reduction
requirements upon electric utilities, they might have to switch fuels in order to meet the
requirements. They might need to switch from coal to natural gas to meet fairly stringent
reduction targets and very strict standards might drive them toward innovative technologies, such
as almost-zero polluting fuel cells and solar energy.64 But joint implementation may allow them
to avoid this. Utility operators may eschew expensive innovation to meet a strict reduction target
at home in favor of upgrading a very dirty plant abroad with off-the-shelf technology at very
modest cost, or better yet, claiming credits for tree planting projects of uncertain benefit.
Some writers have suggested that emissions trading provides a continuing incentive to
reduce “because the number of permits remain limited.”65 Hence, economic growth will increase
the demand for permits, raise the price, and provide a greater incentive for polluters to reduce
their emissions.66
Limiting the number of permits does not create an incentive for continuous net emission
reductions below the equilibrium level required by the program. Limiting the number of total
permits without decreasing the amount of emissions the permits allow would involve tolerating
increases in emissions attributable to economic growth to the extent that existing polluters
generate compensating pollution reductions (credits). Net emissions would remain consistent
with those authorized by the promulgated emission limits, but would not decrease below that
level.67
A legal rule limiting the number of permits creates incentives to avoid increases above
the mandated level, whether or not the permits can be traded. The premise that a trading program
limits the number of permits tacitly assumes that a legal rule prohibits the sources of additional
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See Remarks at the National Geographic Society, 1997 <BI>Pub. Papers<D> 1408
(Oct. 22, 1997) (President Clinton’s statement on climate change policy).
64

See generally, At Last, The Fuel Cell, <BI>The Economist<D>, Oct. 25, 1997, at 89;
Andrew C. Revkin, Under Solar Bill, Homeowners Could Cut Electricity Cost to Zero,
<BI>N.Y. Times<D>, July 25, 1996, at B1.
65

See, e.g., Tripp & Dudek, supra note 69, at 374.

66

Id.

67

See Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
<BI>Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.<D> 1, 13 (1985) (“Given a fixed supply of permits . . . [t]he system
will ensure that we . . . keep in place.”).
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pollution caused by economic growth from operating without purchased emission allowances.68
An argument that a trading program restrains growth in emissions from economic growth also
requires an assumption that the trading regime imposes a cap on the mass of emissions of the
sources within a trading program (as in the acid rain program). A program authorizing trading to
meet rate-based emission limitations or allowing any pollution source to operate without
purchased allowances would tolerate increases in emissions associated with economic growth
without demanding compensating credits.69 So even the modest argument that trading can
restrain growth in emissions applies only to a particular idealized trading program, not emissions
trading in general.
A traditional regulatory program that prohibits economic growth from creating additional
emissions would, in theory, also provide a continuing incentive to avoid net emission increases in
response to economic growth.70 Of course, traditional regulations can limit pollution by mass
rather than by rate, and sometimes has. Hence, traditional regulation and emissions trading based
on rates fail to constrain emissions in the face of growth in production, but limits on mass,

68

Tripp & Dudek, supra note 69, at 375. This may be quite a heroic assumption, since
adopting and enforcing a prohibition on all pollution may prove difficult politically. The Clean
Air Act (CAA) does not currently contain such a prohibition. The Clean Water Act does contain
a general prohibition on non-permitted discharges. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (Act prohibits discharge of pollutants without a permit); EPA
v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (same);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cf. Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 107-108 (1992) (EPA may permit discharges into water bodies violating
existing water quality standards). But the courts and EPA have not always faithfully implemented
the prohibition of non-permitted discharges. See Axline & McGinley, Universal Statutes &
Planetary Programs: How EPA Has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 <BI>J. Envtl. L. &
Litig.<D> 253 (1993); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that discharges of pollutants not listed in permit is permissible); Joanna Bowen,
Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Second Circuit Affirms the NPDES
Permit as a Shield and Tries to Sink the Clean Water Act, 12 <BI>Pace Envtl. L. Rev.<D> 269
(1994) (arguing that court interpreted the Act more narrowly than EPA, which believes that
pollutants not listed in permit application cannot be discharged). Cf. Northwest Envtl. Advocates
v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995) (citizens may sue to enforce water quality
conditions in permits, not just effluent limitations).
69

See Swift, supra note 4, at 18 (explaining that emission rates do not necessarily prevent
increases in the mass of emissions).
70

The traditional program would simply duplicate the assumptions implicit in the trading
model Tripp and Dudek tacitly advance. The government would set mass based emission
limitations for pollution sources, something that must occur in the trading program as well. The
same background legal rule would apply prohibiting the government from granting permits to
new sources of emissions.
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whether expressed in performance standards or tradable allowances, may constrain emissions in
the face of growth. A legal rule prohibiting all non-permitted emissions would improve the
environmental performance of either an emissions trading scheme or traditional regulation. But
even an idealized emissions trading program does not provide a more continuous incentive for
pollution reduction than a comparable traditional regulation.
One might support the idea of that trading provides superior incentives for innovation by
pointing out that once a planned reduction goal is met, the government can always set another
more ambitious reduction goal.71 If the government could be counted on to continuously revise
standards, then a continuous incentive to reduce would exist. But notice that this would be true
whether or not the government authorized trading as the means of meeting the continuously
revised goal. Even without trading, a government program that could be reliably counted upon to
makes its requirements more stringent would provide an incentive for continuous reductions.
But a major critique of traditional regulation holds that it fails to provide an incentive for
continuous environmental improvement, precisely because the government cannot be depended
upon to strengthen standards in a predictable manner.72 Problems of complexity, uncertainty, and
delay prevent regulators from predictably tightening limits. These problems limit traditional
regulation’s ability to stimulate innovation. Does emissions trading overcome this problem?
The answer seems to be no. If an administrative body sets the limits underlying a trading
program, then the problems of the complexity of administrative environmental decisionmaking
and the attendant delay may infect these decisions, just as they infect decisionmaking in
traditional programs.73 A good example comes from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
efforts to foster a regional market for nitrogen oxides across a broad region of ozone transport,
which has been plagued by delays and uncertainty.74 The resulting uncertainty can lessen
incentives to innovate, just as uncertainty about future emission limitations reduces such
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<BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 61.

72

See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 174; Stewart, Innovation, supra note 10, at

1273-77.
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See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 327-32; Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory
Reforms, 37 <BI>Stan. L. Rev.<D> 1267, 1290 (1985) (to the extent that trading programs can
be adjusted to respond to new information, they present the same moving target problem as
traditional regulation).
74

See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1036-1040 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(reciting some of litigious history of this emissions trading program, prior to remanding EPA’s
rule calling on states to adopt an emissions trading program). In fact, EPA’s rulemaking in this
case does not create the emissions trading program directly, but relies upon subsequent state
implementing rules. In addition, a long effort to negotiate this program precedes the event recited
in the opinion.
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incentives in traditional regulation.75 Further, just as traditional regulation uses technological,
cost-benefit, or health-based criteria to set limitations, the same criteria can be used to set the
limitations governing trading programs.76 Also, private parties have significant incentives to
litigate disliked stringency determinations and allocation decisions.77
Congressional mandates of specific emission reductions may circumvent some of the
problems with administrative decisionmaking, including hard look judicial review.78 Congress
has, in fact, circumvented administrative problems by mandating specific cuts of named

75

Jeanne M. Dennis, Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading
Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 40 <BI>UCLA L. Rev.<D> 1101, 1105
(1993) (if the need for reduction in acid rain becomes more urgent, allowances might be
confiscated, thus upsetting the market); Suzi Clare Kerr, Contracts and Tradeable Permit Markets
in International and Domestic Environmental Protection 6 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University) (because of high levels of scientific uncertainty and changing preferences
regulatory systems must periodically readjust targets). Professor Stewart envisions “depreciating
permits” over time according to a predetermined schedule. See Stewart, Innovation, supra note
10, at 1333. He suggests that this proposal would obviate the need for “constant administrative or
legislative tightening.” Id. at 1332-33.
Emissions trading schemes that do not have a fixed long-term depreciation schedule still
may require periodic tightening. A long-term depreciation schedule can be applied to either
marketable or unmarketable permits. Hence, whatever certainty this idea might create would
exist with or without emissions trading. Professor Stewart’s proposal may make sense. But it’s
not really an argument about emissions trading.
76

For example, California’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program
allows adjustment of reduction allocations based on technology reviews. These reviews assume
that the facilities should reduce their emissions to levels equivalent to those under the traditional
regulations RECLAIM replaced. <BI>South Coast Air Quality Management District, Second
Annual RECLAIM Program Audit Report<D> 19-20 (1997) (on file with author). The South
Coast Air Quality Management District has allocated additional emission allowances, thereby
harming air quality, when it concluded that a facility could not meet its target through locally
applied technology known to the SCAQMD. Id. at 72-73.
77

See Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving
claim seeking additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d
643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 526, 526 (7th Cir.
1994) (same); Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272, 272-74 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
78

See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 <BI>UCLA L. Rev.<D> 740, 808, 815 (1983). Professors Stewart and Ackerman seem to
have assumed that Congress would always set the limits associated with emissions trading. See
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 190.
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pollutants through centralized emissions trading,79 decentralized standard setting,80 and
centralized standard setting81. The scarcity of congressional time may limit the frequency of
congressional mandates.82 However, congressionally set limits have often fared relatively well
and should be pursued.83 Yet the advantages of specific quantitative congressional
decisionmaking occur whether or not pollution sources may use trading as a means to comply
with the limits.84
Hence, the intuition that trading programs are easier to establish and change than
traditional programs rests upon confusion of institutional choice with instrumental choice.
Administrators establishing trading programs face many of the same problems that have
interfered with efforts to make non-trading programs predictable stimulants of continuous
innovation. And Congress, to the extent it avoids political paralysis, can overcome these
problems with either trading or non-trading programs.
Some authors believe that trading programs may prove easier to establish, because
lowered cost will translate into lowered polluter resistance. But polluters with high local
pollution control costs may not have information about lower cost options at other facilities, and
may therefore fight just as hard as ever. Much will depend, however, upon political
circumstances. Polluters will lobby if the potential gains from doing so make it worthwhile,
regardless of whether the potential maximum loss has diminished. Often, even if polluters
anticipate fully the reduced cost from trading, potential gains from avoiding limits or weakening
them will provide sufficient incentives for vigorous advocacy sufficient to stall progress.
Lawyers are expensive, but rarely as expensive as meaningful pollution control. Certainly, no
rule exists that trading automatically leads to tightened limits.
In any case, most claims that trading encourages innovation have not relied upon political
economy arguments hypothesizing tighter limits. Rather, they have rested upon inherent
characteristics of trading that apply even when they aim at identical limits to those used in a
traditional regulation. Hence, this is the framework employed here.
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See 42 U.S.C. §7651(b)(setting goal of acid rain trading program at a cut of ten million
tons of sulfur dioxide).
80

See 42 U.S.C. §7511a(b)(1)(generally requiring states to cut volatile organic
compounds by 15% from 1990 levels).
81

See 42 U.S.C. §7521(g)(setting numerical standards for vehicle emissions).

82

See David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the “New”
Nondelegation Doctrine, 66 <BI>Pitt. L. Rev.<D> 1, 65-67 (2002) (describing constraints on
congressional time as a barrier to specific legislation).
83

See David M. Driesen, Five Lessons From Clean Air Act Implementation, 14 <BI>Pace
Envtl. L. Rev.<D> 51, 53-55 (1997).
84

Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 329.
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The Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy and the Law
Most analysts employ a simplistic command and control/economic incentive dichotomy
as a substitute for cogent analysis.85 They claim that traditional regulation discourages
innovation.86 Indeed, some of the less careful writing states that standard regulation prohibits
innovation.87 If this were true, emissions trading obviously would encourage innovation better
than traditional regulation.
While the claim that traditional regulation often does not stimulate innovation has great
merit, the view that it prohibits or blocks innovation altogether involves gross exaggeration and
some significant misunderstandings.88 These misunderstandings interfere with sound comparison
of traditional regulation with emissions trading.
Environmental statutes usually encourage performance standards--a form of a standard
that specifies a level of environmental performance89 rather than the use of a particular
technique.90 Performance standards may encourage innovation by allowing polluters to choose
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Id. at 290-91.

86

See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 1, at 220; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester,
Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, 6 <BI>Yale
J. on Reg.<D> 109, 109 (1989).
87

See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 94, at 109 (“command and control
regulations . . . specify the methods and technologies that firms must use to control pollution”).
See also Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 1, at 220.
88

See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 183-87 (discussing error
of treating regulations not encouraging innovation well as “barriers to innovation”).
89

See United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir. 1985). The technologybased standards for air emissions from new automobiles are also performance standards. They
dictate a precise limitation, not a precise method for achieving the limitation. See 42 U.S.C.
§7521(g). The technology-based regulations that states with dirty air must promulgate may also
be performance standards. The CAA requires state plans to “provide for the implementation of
all reasonably available control measures,” but not through “command and control” mandates. 42
U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). Rather, it requires “reductions in emissions from existing sources . . . as
may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available control
technology.” Id. EPA and the courts have interpreted this statutory language as authorizing
promulgation of numerical emission limitations that do not dictate the precise compliance
method. See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1986).
90

See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 5-6 (“A performance standard typically identifies
a specific goal . . . and gives firms some latitude in meeting this target. These standards do not
specify the means, and therefore, provide greater flexibility. . . .”); Stewart, Innovation, supra
18

how to comply.91
Many statutory provisions severely restrict EPA’s authority to specify mandatory
compliance methods.92 Several provisions require a performance standard unless EPA finds that
one cannot measure emissions directly to determine compliance.93 Even when the statutes permit
work practice standards or other types of standards that do command specific control techniques,
the statutes often require EPA to approve adequately demonstrated alternatives.94
This predominance of performance-based standards over command-and-control
regulation exists regardless of the criteria used to determine the standards’ stringency. Statutory
provisions requiring technology-based standards, for example, instruct implementing agencies to
set standards that are achievable with either existing or, in some cases, future technology.95
Hence, agency views concerning technological capability help determine the standards’
stringency.96 Owners of pollution sources may generally use any adequate technology they
choose to comply with the performance standards that an agency has developed through the

note 10, at 1268 (“Performance standards allow regulated firms flexibility to select the least
costly or least burdensome means of achieving compliance.”) Cf. Stewart, Risks, supra note 1, at
158 (“Regulatory commands dictate specific behavior by each plant, facility, or product
manufacturer . . . .”).
91

<BI>Louis G. Tornatzky & Mitchell Fleischer, The Processes of Technological
Innovation<D> 101 (1990); Malloy, supra note 18, at 546-547 & n.52 (performance standards
have the express purpose of “encouraging innovation”).
92

See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating
that EPA may not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline because CAA mandates
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that authority to set performance standards does not include authority to specify fuels).
93

See 42 U.S.C. §§7411(h)(1); 7412(d)(2)(D), (h)(1)-(2), (h)(4).
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See 42 U.S.C. §§7412(h)(3); 7411(h)(3).
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7412(d)(2); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180 (6th Cir.
1986); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 360-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Usually
statutory provisions do allow EPA to take cost and some other factors into consideration. See,
e.g., id. at 319-336. The courts may reverse EPA if its view about the level technology can
achieve is arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., id. (upholding standard as achievable and consistent
with statute); National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (remanding to collect
additional data because record inadequately supports achievability of the standard).
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evaluation of a reference technology.97
Professor Ackerman’s detailed study of a particularly controversial new source
performance standard (NSPS) under the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments may have
indirectly contributed to frequent characterization of technology-based standards as “command
and control” regulation.98 Economists accustomed to a static framework of analysis read
Professor Ackerman’s statements that this NSPS involved “forced scrubbing” as indicating that
“technology-based standards identify particular equipment that must be used to comply with the
regulation.”99 This NSPS, however, allowed utilities to meet their emission limitations through
innovative means, although it precluded complete reliance upon techniques that could not meet
the emission limitations.
This NSPS limited sulfur dioxide emissions to 1.2 pounds (lbs.) per million British
thermal units (MBtu).100 It also required a 90% reduction from uncontrolled levels except for
plants emitting less than 0.6 lbs./MBtu.101 These cleaner plants needed only to meet a 70%
reduction requirement.102 Nothing in the regulation specifically required any particular
technology, such as wet scrubbing. Indeed, EPA specifically designed the regulation to leave
open opportunities for plants to meet the standards through dry scrubbing and other alternatives
that EPA regarded as somewhat experimental.103 Hence, if a plant operator developed some
completely new approach that met these standards, the utility could use it.
Operators probably could not meet this standard solely through the use of coal washing,
because coal washing, which was not a new innovation at the time, probably could not produce a
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See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A); E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 122 & n.9 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 787 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir.
1986); Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1980); American Paper
Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526
F.2d 1027, 1045 (3d. Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d. Cir. 1977).
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See <BI>Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air<D> 15-21
(1981) [hereinafter <BI>Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal<D>].
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Compare Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 5 with Bruce A. Ackerman & William T.
Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 <BI>Yale L. J.<D> 1466, 148188 (1980) (discussing NSPS that allegedly mandated flue gas scrubbing) [hereinafter, Ackerman
& Hassler, New Deal]; <BI>Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal<D>, supra note 106, at 15-21
(same).
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Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 324, 327-28, 340-43, 346-47.
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70% reduction by itself.104 Reading Professor Ackerman’s reference to the NSPS as a standard
based on “full scrubbing” to indicate that the NSPS precluded subsequent innovations meeting
the numerical standards would involve technical misunderstanding of the regulation. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained in reviewing this NSPS that
“given the present state of pollution control technology, utilities will have to employ some form
of . . . scrubbing.”105 This necessarily implies that if utilities can develop a new technology that
meets the required emission limit, nothing in the regulation precludes its use, a conclusion that
necessarily flows from the numerical limits stated in the standard in any case.
This error reflects a habit of thinking in static terms. Thinking in more dynamic terms
about the possibility of new technology makes it impossible to equate the NSPS Ackerman
studies with specification of a technology.106
In any event, one cannot draw general conclusions about the character of an entire
regulatory system from a single case. A more thorough analysis of the system as a whole shows
that most technology-based regulation does not command use of a particular technique. The
claim that technology-based regulation does require use of the particular technology that the
agency used to justify the regulation simply reflects an oft-repeated legal error, reflecting habits
of thinking in static terms.
A static frame of reference has frequently led to characterization of technology-based
regulation as “command-and-control” regulation. This term is misleading, except as applied to
the relatively rare standards that actually specify techniques rather than just performance levels.
Moreover, emissions trading cannot substitute for true command-and-control regulation,
regulation that requires specific techniques.107 The law only authorizes command-and-control
regulation when measurement of emissions is impossible.108 Trading, however, relies upon good
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See id. at 368-73; Ackerman & Hassler, New Deal, supra note 107, at 1481; Bruce A.
Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Reply, 90 <BI>Yale L. J.<D> 1412,
1421-22 n.43 (1981). Cf. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 <BI>Stan. L.
Rev.<D> 1267, 1277 n.41 (1985) (noting that standard allows using coal washing as offset,
decreasing the percentage reduction needed from scrubbing); <BI>Ackerman & Hassler, Clean
Coal<D>, supra note 106, at 15, 66-68 (noting that coal washing reduces any given emissions
base by only 20-40%, but replacing new source standards with less stringent reduction
requirement that also applies to existing sources would produce better results)
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Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
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<BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 51.
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See Kerr, supra note 83, at 66.
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See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62608, 62646 (1992) (codified
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monitoring.109 When good measurement proves impossible, trading will not succeed.
The incorrect suggestion that traditional regulation generally requires government-chosen
technology would lead to a conclusion that traditional regulation legally forbids innovation. But
some have made more subtle incentive-based arguments for characterizing traditional regulation
as discouraging innovation.
The fundamental notion that economic incentives are powerful would suggest that
polluters have substantial economic incentives to use the flexibility that performance standards
offer to employ innovative means of meeting emission limitations that are less costly than
traditional compliance methods. Such use of innovations saves polluters money. This incentive
exists even for technology-based performance standards that did not contemplate the innovative
compliance mechanism a polluter discovers.
Professor Richard Stewart of New York University, however, has stated that polluters
have “strong incentives to adopt the particular technology underlying” a technology-based
performance standard because “its use will readily persuade regulators of compliance.”110 He
does not explain why this countervailing persuasion incentive would overcome the economic
incentive to realize savings through an effective and cheaper innovation, even if the
persuasiveness incentive were powerful. Polluters, after all, have a number of means of
persuading regulators that their innovations perform adequately if they in fact do so. First,
polluters may monitor their pollution directly to demonstrate compliance. Second, in some cases
polluters may eliminate regulated chemicals, which certainly demonstrates compliance.
Traditional regulation offers ample incentives for pollution prevention eliminating chemicals or
reducing them below regulatory thresholds. In any case, neither Professor Stewart nor anybody
else has come forward with empirical evidence that polluters with compliant and cheap
innovations have failed to employ them because of fears of permitting difficulties under a
performance standard.111 While polluters have an equally powerful economic incentive to use
cheaper innovative compliance methods for true command-and-control regulations, the polluter

as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposed Dec. 31, 1992); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 294-95 (Stevens J., dissenting) (work practice standard promulgated for
asbestos because asbestos emissions from demolition cannot be measured); Sierra Club, 657
F.2d at 317 n.38.
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Hahn & Hester, supra note 94, at 111 (monitoring and enforcement issues play critical
role in efficient design of emissions trading); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so
Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 <BI>Duke L.J.<D> 729,
748-49 (1991) (“[E]missions trading and pollution taxes require inspectors to monitor constantly
the amount of pollution that a plant emits.”); Stewart, Risks, supra note 1, at 161, 166.
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Stewart, Innovation, supra note 10, at 1269.
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Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 302 n.65; Nicholas A. Ashford & George R.
Heaton Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 <BI>Law &
Contemp. Probs.<D>, 109, 139-40 (Summer 1983).
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may have more difficulty persuading a regulator that an alternative is viable if she cannot
measure emissions directly. Nevertheless, the polluter can deploy her substantial expertise to
estimate the effectiveness of alternative techniques and may persuade regulators to accept
alternatives. Indeed, she may persuade a regulator that a less effective technique is equally
effective because the regulator may feel insecure in second-guessing a company’s judgment.
Many polluting companies do not shy away from urging alternative means of complying with
performance standards upon permit writers after promulgation of technology-based regulations.
Empirical Evidence
The literature, however, gives the impression that solid empirical proof supports
emissions trading’s superiority in stimulating innovation. The literature discusses two types of
evidence, both surprisingly thin:112 Evidence that traditional regulation does not simulate
innovation and evidence that emissions trading does.
Traditional Regulation
The empirical literature on traditional regulation shows that industry sometimes chooses
techniques different from those an agency relies upon in standard setting.113 Because so many
studies claim that traditional regulation, usually described as command-and-control regulation,
thwarts innovation, a brief review of some of the cases where this simply has not proven true
seems worthwhile. Most industry responded to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA’s) and EPA’s regulation of vinyl chloride in ways that the agencies
anticipated. But a proprietary “stripping process,” commercialized within a year of promulgation,
significantly improved polyvinyl chloride resin production while lowering vinyl chloride
exposure, and industry adopted a number of other innovations as well.114 Textile manufacturers
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See Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 55 (because of a “paucity of available data,” there has
been “exceptionally little empirical analysis” of instrument choice’s effect upon innovation.);
Malloy, supra note 18, at 547 (empirical evidence provides “inconclusive evidence of significant
environmental innovation under existing trading programs.”)
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See Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental
Regulation, 9 <BI>Fordham Envt’l L. J.<D> 1, 32 (1997) (innovation sometimes results from
emission and discharge limits). See, e.g., <BI>U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Gauging Control Technology and Regulatory Impacts in Occupational Safety and Health--An
Appraisal of OSHA’s Analytical Approach<D>, OTA-Env-635, at 64 (U.S. Government Printing
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<BI>OTA Study<D>, supra note 121, at 89. Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using
Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 <BI>Harv. Envt’l L. Rev.<D> 419, 440-41
(1985).
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met OSHA’s cotton dust standard, to a significant extent, through modernization of equipment
unanticipated by the government, which was needed anyway to compete with foreign
companies.115 While a few metal foundries responded to standards for formaldehyde in the
workplace through ventilation and enclosure (as expected by OSHA), most developed lowformaldehyde resins.116 This shows that traditional regulation can encourage pollution
prevention. Similarly, while most established smelters responded to sulfur dioxide limits by
using available technologies, copper mining firms developed a new, cleaner, process to assist
their entry into the smelting business.117
Industry responded to a ban upon ozone depleting chemicals with a variety of
innovations.118 The makers of ozone depleting substances developed new chemicals that
damaged the ozone layer less severely.119 And many former users of ozone depleters simply
substituted soap and water for chemical solvents.120 Operators of chloralkali plants responded to
EPA regulation of mercury with some process innovations.121 When EPA began phasing out
mirex (a pesticide that controlled fire ants), EPA had registered no acceptable substitutes.122 But
during a two-year phase-out period four companies sought registration of substitutes.123 Clearly
the claim that traditional regulation always discourages innovation is simply wrong.
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<BI>OTA Study<D>, supra note 121, at 90.
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Id. at 95. OSHA anticipated this possibility, but not the extent to which it dominated
compliance strategies. Id.
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See Strasser, supra note 121, at 28-29.

118

See <BI>Ozone Depletion in the United States: Elements of Success<D> (Elizabeth
Cook, ed. 1996).
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See id. at 14-15, 23-26, 58-60, 90-94, 98-104, 109.

120

See U.S. EPA, Benefits of the CFC Phaseout, at
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/geninfo/benefits.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2001)(citing “aqueous
cleaning” as an example of a cleaning process that reduced cost in phasing out CFCs);
<BI>ICOLP Technical Committee, Eliminating CFC-113 and Methyl Chloroform in Precision
Cleaning Operations<D> 114 (1994) (defining “aqueous cleaning” as cleaning parts with water
to which suitable detergents, sapnifers or other additives may be added).
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See Ashford et al., supra note 122, at 437 (describing separation of process from
cooling water to reduce contact with mercury as a “significant process innovation.”).
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See Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation,
27 <BI>Loy. L.A. L. Rev.<D> 943, 947 (1994) (discussing experience with lead and pesticide
bans).
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Id.
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These examples do not, however, show that traditional regulation regularly stimulates
innovation. While evidence on this subject is actually thin because of the scarcity of postcompliance studies,124 most traditional regulation probably does little to stimulate innovation.
Most of this regulation allows polluters to meet the standard through relatively cheap existing
technology.125 This “mediocre regulation” does not require stringent pollution reductions that
would make conventional techniques either insufficient or very expensive.126 By contrast, when
government imposes very stringent regulation, companies tend to innovate because the
conventional approaches become either inadequate or expensive.127
Emissions Trading
The evidence regarding emissions trading establishes that it, like traditional regulation,
sometimes encourages innovation, but sometimes does not. A brief review of some of the
principal programs follow.
Bubbles: Inadequate Environmental Performance
Bubble programs allow plant operators to trade emission reductions among polluting
units within a plant. The empirical literature raises especially serious questions about whether
bubbles have spurred adequate environmental performance.128 The few studies of bubble
implementation reveal that polluters often could not document claims that they had made
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See Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 55.
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See generally <BI>Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?<D> (1993) (regulation’s economic impact to
minor to have great impact upon competitiveness). See also Stephen M. Meyer,
Environmentalism and Economic Prosperity: Testing the Environmental Impact Hypothesis (Oct.
5, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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See, e.g., <BI>Environmental Law Institute, Barriers to Environmental Technology
Innovation and Use<D> (1998).
127

See Malloy, supra note 18, at 549-550; Ashford et al., supra note 122, at 432-444
(discussing examples); McGarity, supra note 130, at 945-52 (discussing experience with lead and
pesticide bans).
128

See <BI>Richard A. Liroff, Air Pollution Offsets: Trading Selling and Banking<D>
28-29 (1980) [hereinafter <BI>Liroff, Offsets<D>] (noting the need to avoid “paper offsets,”
reductions in emissions that exist only on paper). See generally Dudek & Palmisano, supra note
1, at 236-237 (noting that emissions trading has been the “harbinger of bad news”).
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required emission reductions.129 Where polluters could verify claimed reductions, they often
involved using credits from activities that would have occurred anyway to justify escape from
pollution reduction obligations that would have otherwise generated additional pollution
reductions.130 Hence, gaming has been a problem.
129

For example, when EPA and its California counterpart inspected plants to verify
compliance with bubble regulations for the aerospace industry in the late 1980s, they found that
“almost all large sources operating under . . . bubbles . . . are not achieving the emission
reductions or levels of control that are required.” See California Air Resources Board and U.S.
EPA, Phase III Rule Effectiveness Study of the Aerospace Coating Industry 4 (1990)
(unpublished report on file with author); See also David Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, 4
<BI>Envtl. F.<D> 33, 34-35 (1985); <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>, supra note 66, at 80-89 (examples of
bubbles that avoided requirements to reduce actual emission levels). Hahn and Hester have
concluded that emissions trading (defined to include bubbling and netting) has had “a negligible
effect on environmental quality.” Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 94, at 137. They do not,
however, base this assertion on empirical data. Rather, they rely “on the fact that the rules
governing the various trading programs contain prohibitions against trades that would result in
significant increases in emissions.” Id. at 137 n.146. They do not explain the basis for their belief
that these rules are adequate and the implicit assumption that they have been regularly and
correctly enforced. In any case, subsequent experience suggests they have not prevented abuse.
The claim that bubbles have had a “negligible effect” on environmental quality may be
read as consistent with a conclusion that bubbles have been a failure. If this negligible effect
claim suggests that bubbles have not produced increases in pollution relative to baseline levels,
then negligible effect constitutes gross failure. For the rules that the bubbles apply to were
supposed to produce decreases in emissions rather than just limit increases.
The actual conclusions of EPA officials relying on real data that Hahn and Hester cite
seem consistent with failure. They report no reductions in actual emissions. Id. at 129 & n.105
(describing the data backing this up). Hahn and Hester also cite a statement from the head of the
Reagan era EPA’s regulatory reform staff, the primary advocate of emissions trading within
EPA, stating that bubbles led to “substantially greater emissions reductions than conventional
limits, with the rest producing equivalent reductions.” Id. at 129 & n.104. But Dr. Liroff has
stated that the statements of the regulatory reform staff have been misleading as to bubble
performance. <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>, supra note 66, at 62-67. Hahn and Hester cite no real data
supporting these statements.
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Dr. Liroff provides many examples of these bubbles. See <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>, supra
note 66, at 62-67, 89-91. Dr. Liroff explains that states lured new plants in the 1970s by
providing them with offsets that the state itself created. <BI>Liroff, Offsets<D>, supra note 136,
at 13-17. The offset consisted of a paper credit for “an asphalt substitution process that already
was occurring for nonenvironmental reasons.” Id. at 16. Accord Citizens Against the Refinery’s
Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1981). Liroff states that “the offset policy can be a
meaningless paper game for abating pollution.” <BI>Liroff, Offsets<D>, supra note 136, at 22.
But the experience varies from state to state. Id. Dr. Liroff cites some examples of
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EPA introduced bubbles primarily as deregulatory mechanisms131 and they have often
stimulated neither innovation nor adequate environmental performance at a cheaper price.132
Rather, they probably have generated cost savings for industry, often by allowing unverifiable
claims of compliance and paper credits to substitute for actual emission reductions and by
reducing pollution reduction demands.133

bubbles that he regards as models. His evaluation of these bubbles shows clearly that they
reduced emissions below prior baseline levels. See, e.g., <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>, supra note 66, at
68 (actual emissions thousands of tons below uncontrolled levels). He concludes that “bubbles
can reduce emissions below levels otherwise required.” Id. at 68-69. But he does not appear to
have compared the reductions that traditional regulation would have achieved to the bubble
regulation in all cases. See, e.g., id. at 70-71.
Polluters have sought to claim credits even when they have taken no action to reduce
pollution below actual emissions levels, by seeking to measure emission reductions against an
“allowable” emissions baseline. See generally Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 94, at 116117 (discussing the difference between actual and allowable baselines); <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>,
supra note 66, at 15-16 (discussing various baseline issues). Since pollution sources usually
leave a “compliance cushion” this allows them to generate a paper credit without doing anything
to reduce pollution.
Polluters have sometimes claimed credits for shutting down pollution sources or
production slow-downs, even when they have done this for business reasons, not in order to seek
environmental improvement. Id. at 117-118; Comment, Emission-Offset Banking:
Accommodating Industrial Growth with Air-Quality Standards, 128 <BI>U. Penn. L. Rev.<D>
937, 937 (1980).
Federal rules authorize paper credits when they fail to prohibit claiming reductions based
on activities undertaken to meet state rules. If a pollution source can claim credits for actions
taken to comply with state rules, then regulations designed to bring about real reductions from
previously unregulated (or inadequately regulated) pollution sources will use what states have
already accomplished to justify doing nothing further.
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See <BI>Liroff, Toil<D>, supra note 66, at 37-38 (describing genesis of the bubble
idea in the steel industry).
132

Id. at 100 (most “innovations”under bubbles are merely rearrangements of
conventional technologies).
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See id. at 99 (“cost saving approaches are not necessarily more cost-effective ways of
meeting a goal, instead, they may be ways to avoid costs that may be necessary to meet the
goal”); Richard A. Liroff, Point and Counterpoint: The Bubble: Will it Float Free or Deflate, 4
<BI>Envtl. F.<D> 28, 30 (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter, Liroff, Point] (stating that a compliance
method that relaxes regulatory requirements at some points without compensating reductions
may be more prevalent than bubbles that reduce actual emissions); David D. Doniger, Point . . .
And Counterpoint, 4 <BI>Envtl. F.<D> 29, 34 (“In practice . . . there has been far more
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Lead Phase-Down: A Stringent Limitation Driving Substantial Change
EPA allowed gasoline producers to trade lead allowances during a phase-down of lead
from gasoline.134 The lead phase-down did create a substantial change, the reformulation and then
virtual elimination of leaded gasoline. But the driver for this achievement seems to be the
underlying requirement of a phase-down of lead. Faithful implementation of a traditional phasedown without trading would probably have produced the same change more quickly.135
Indeed, in a very sophisticated empirical analysis of the lead trading program employing
the oft-neglected Malueg model, economists Suzi Kerr and Richard Newell conclude that

innovation in shell games and sharp accounting practices than in pollution control technology.”);
Proposed Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 39668, 39670
(Aug. 3, 1995) (“Bubbles, netting and offsets have reduced source’s overall compliance costs.
However, there have been significant problems of quality control, reducing the environmental
effectiveness of the programs.”).
134

For accounts of the program, see Suzi Kerr & David Mare, Market Efficiency in
Tradeable Permit Markets with Transaction Costs: Empirical Evidence from the United States
Lead Phasedown in Kerr, supra note 83; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable
Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 <BI>Ecology L.Q.<D>361, 380-391 (1989)
[hereinafter, Hahn & Hester, Lessons]; Kerr & Newell, supra note 25. I refer to this as an
example of trading for simplicity’s sake. Because the rule authorized intertemporal trades, this
rule also exemplifies “banking” of emission credits.
135

The introduction of inter-refinery trading into the lead phasedown program probably
slowed the pace of environmental improvement. EPA’s 1985 trading rule actually led to
increased production of leaded gasoline in 1985 (rather than purely unleaded) because the rule
allowed increased production of low lead gasoline to generate credits. See Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 13116, 13119 (Apr. 2, 1985); Hahn &
Hester, Lessons, supra note 142, at 382 n.125; <BI>U.S.General Accounting Office, Vehicle
Emissions: EPA Program to Assist Leaded-Gasoline Producers<D> 20 (1986) [hereinafter
<BI>GAO, Vehicle Emissions<D>]. EPA’s 1985 lead trading rule supplanted a rule that required
refiners to meet a standard of 1.1 grams of lead per leaded gallon, effective January 1, 1986. 50
Fed. Reg. at 13116. The 1985 trading rule allowed refiners that banked purchased credits to
continue exceeding these limits through the end of 1987. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13177, 13127 (codified
at 40 C.F.R. §80.20(e)(2)(1988)). Furthermore, in actual implementation inadequate reporting,
compliance verification, and enforcement may have marred environmental performance. See
<BI>GAO, Vehicle Emissions<D> at 3-4, 18-19, 23-24 (citing failure to enforce against 25
potential violators, 49 cases of claimed credits not matching claimed sales of credits, error rates
in reporting between 14% and 49.2% and no verification of compliance). Cf. Hahn & Hester,
Lessons, supra note 142, at 388, n.146.
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“greater stringency . . . encouraged adoption of lead-reducing technology.”136 They credit the
trading with providing flexibility in the timing and distribution of reductions, which lowered the
cost of the technological transition the stringency of a phase-out brought about.137
Acid Rain: Little Trading or Innovation
The acid rain trading program has produced some changes in scrubber technology,
operational methods, and the use of cleaner coal, which some analysts describe as innovations.138
But only 3 of 51 firms used interfacility trading to meet their reduction obligations (although 30
of the 51 did use some intrafacility averaging).139 So, analysts should hesitate to ascribe those
results to trading. Byron Swift of the Environmental Law Institute has claimed that EPA’s old
rate-based standards would not have permitted some of the innovations he identified, but he
admits that a mass-based program without trading would have allowed most of the technologies
he identifies as innovations.140
As a general matter, it’s hard to consider coal scrubbing, use of low sulfur coal, or
dispatch orders favoring cleaner units as innovations, since all of these techniques have been well
understood options for many years.141 Nevertheless, some of the improvements in scrubbing have
received patents, which suggests that they might qualify as genuine innovations.142
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See Kerr & Newell, supra note 25, at 4 (emphasis added).
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See id. at 4, 23-24.
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See, e.g., Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ELR 10330 (Mar. 2001).
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See id. at 10331.
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Swift does claim that trading was essential to two technologies. Id. at 10338. One of
those “technologies,” trading, is a transaction, not a technology. He does not claim that the other
technology, power shifting, is an innovation. Indeed, the shifting of dispatch orders to use cleaner
units more intensively than dirty units is a well-understood operational option.
141

See generally Malloy, supra note 18, at 548-49 (discussing debate about innovation
under the acid rain program).
142

Other papers also employ very broad definitions of innovation and stop short of
attributing the observed “innovations” to trading alone. For example, Dallas Burtraw describes
various kinds of non-patentable practices as innovations. Dallas Burtraw, Innovation under the
Tradable Sulfur Dioxide Emission Permits Program in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 17 (Resources
for the Future Discussion Paper 00-38, 2000). These include rather routine adaptations to the
opportunity to sell abatement technologies, which one would expect with a comparably designed
performance standard. For example, he describes laying track and changing the size of trains (to
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But David Popp of the Maxwell School of Citizenship finds that both the acid rain
program and prior traditional regulation encouraged the patenting of new technology.143 Indeed,
he shows that there was more patenting of new environmental technologies prior to the
introduction of the acid rain program. He states, however, that the programs created different
types of technological incentives: the traditional program led to innovations reducing the cost of
scrubbing, while the trading program produced patents improving pollution control
characteristics. Yet this very useful research stops short of proving even the limited proposition
that trading changes the type of innovation. For the non-trading programs that limited sulfur
dioxide emissions prior to 1990 have much laxer limits and a different form of limits than the
trading program enacted in the 1990 Amendments to the CAA. These differences, rather than the
trading, may account for the observed difference. A student of the RECLAIM program makes
the opposite claim, that trading encourages cost-saving innovation, but not improvements in
control technology.144
In any case, so far the acid rain program has not produced significant diffusion or creation
of much cleaner technologies, such as natural gas power plants or renewable energy, nor has it
resulted in really path breaking radical innovation (such as new designs for fuel cells).145 This
suggests that something other than the mere existence of a trading program may be important to
stimulating meaningful innovation.
State Programs After 1990
Since 1990, states have implemented a variety of emissions trading programs. These
programs have performed unevenly in a number of respects. For example, New Jersey
suspended a trading program for poor performance and California’s Reclaim program came

deliver low sulfur coal) as innovations. See id. at 19. He makes no effort to determine whether
the minority of firms engaged in trading employed these “innovations” more vigorously than
firms that simply complied as if this were a standard technology-based performance standard
expressed as a mass-based limit. The paper’s conclusion, consistent with the limitations of this
mode of study, does not claim that emissions trading induced innovation. Instead, he claims that
the acid rain program contributes to the employment of innovation. See id. at 18. But this simply
begs the question of whether a mass-based program with the same limits and no trading would
induce as much or more innovation.
143

See David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990 (NBER
Working Paper #8593, 2001) (forthcoming).
144

See CURTIS MOORE, RECLAIM:
WITH AIR POLLUTION TRADING 17 (2003).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S FAILED EXPERIMENT
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See <BI>A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain
Program<D> 130 (2000).
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under heavy fire for reasons of environmental justice and for poor environmental performance.146
Facilities have primarily relied upon tried and true control technologies in many of these
programs. For example, the regional trading program for nitrogen oxide emission reductions
EPA organized to aid state attainment of the old ozone standard produced a large number of
orders for selective catalytic reduction technologies.147 But some sources have relied on less
conventional techniques, such as ThermaloNOx, rotating overfired air, and reburn technology.148
And many RECLAIM sources have relied upon junking of old cars, which seems imaginative,
but hardly constitutes an advanced innovative technology and creates fraud problems.149 One
RECLAIM critic argues that the program actually discouraged innovation, for reasons having to
do with design flaws.150 EPA’s evaluation of RECLAIM states that most sources relied upon
conventional off-the-shelf technology, but a few used innovative compliance methods.151 Since
very few sources generated credits through over-compliance to sell into the market, it may be
incorrect to ascribe the innovation that did occur under the RECLAIM program to the program’s
authorization of emissions trading.152
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See MOORE, supra note 152, at 2 (describing RECLAIM as a failure in reducing
emissions); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y FORUM 231
(1999); Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; New Jersey; Open
Market Emissions Trading Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 64347 (October 18, 2002) (announcing EPA
decision not to proceed with processing New Jersey SIP revisions, because New Jersey had found
such serious problems in its emissions trading program that it was planning to abandon it)..
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See NESCAUM, POWER COMPANIES’ EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH THE NOX SIP CA;;
AND SECTION 126, 4 (2003) (61 of 100 units with announced commitments have chose selective
catalytic reduction).
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Id.
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See Drury, supra note 153, at 258-263 (discussing fraud in the estimation of credits
and debits that systematically undermines environmental performance).
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See MOORE, supra note 152, at 3-5 (charging that RECLAIM suffocated
environmental innovation).
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See EPA, AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH COST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET-LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND
INNOVATION 26-27 (2002).
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See id. at 21, 27 (relying upon design variables other than the trading possibility to
explain the innovation).
31

Saving a Fragment of the Economists’ Argument
It’s quite clear that the theoretical predicate and empirical basis for the conclusion that
emissions trading encourages innovation better than a comparably designed traditional regulation
is fundamentally inadequate. Emissions trading obviously does nothing to encourage expensive
innovation--even innovation that would produce long-term efficiency and enormous
environmental improvement.
Nor does either the empirical record or sound economic theory strongly support a milder
conclusion, that emissions trading does a better job of encouraging relatively cheap innovation.
Under traditional regulation, the high cost sources have an incentive to adopt any innovation
promising compliance for less cost than its relatively high cost of control. Under emissions
trading, only innovations costing less than the marginal cost of additional reductions at facilities
with relatively low control costs can find a market. Thus, trading discourages innovation by
lowering the price at which innovation will become economically viable.
Nevertheless, Malueg’s model and David Popp’s empirical work point the way toward a
theory that might partially (but only partially) salvage something resembling (but not mirroring)
the standard conclusion. The low cost sources under trading have an incentive to generate extra
emission reductions. High cost sources under comparable traditional regulation face incentives to
adopt innovations that save them money, but not necessarily innovations that increase control
efficiency. So, polluters may have better incentives to innovate to increase control efficiency
under a trading regime than under traditional regulation, even if overall incentives for
maximizing the number of innovations have declined.
This argument, however, may not stand either. First, emissions trading creates enormous
opportunities to use a very wide variety of traditional technologies to generate credits while
avoiding the uncertainty involved in innovation. These opportunities may weaken incentives for
innovations with greater control efficiencies. Traditional technologies typically provide excess
reductions under traditional regulation because sources need to make sure that they remain in
continuous compliance. Under trading, polluters using conventional techniques will sell some of
this surplus, thus lessening any demand for innovation. Furthermore, trading provides
opportunities to engage in minor non-innovative tweaking of operating conditions to generate
excess emission reductions. An example involves using dispatch orders from electric utilities to
use cleaner units more extensively. This is hardly innovative, but it does realize some extra
emission reductions. Trading might well provide good incentives to seize non-innovative (i.e.
obvious) pollution prevention opportunities that provide a small quantity of emission reductions.
Finally, the flexibility for trading may invite use of traditional technologies with relatively weak
environmental performance because every increment has some value. An example involves the
use of low sulfur coal in the acid rain program. Second, by weakening incentives for cost
reducing innovation at high cost facilities, trading may indirectly limit innovations that will
produce higher control efficiencies. Facilities whose high costs come from exceptionally dirty
processes may adopt new technologies just to achieve standard outcomes at their own facilities,
but these same technologies may provide superior environmental performance at cleaner
facilities. And new ideas pursued to lower costs may lead to ideas for greater pollution control.
For a variety of reasons, the hypothesis that emissions trading may systematically change the type
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of innovation induced in a desirable manner might not stand.
This much weaker claim about the nature of innovation, however, stands on firmer
ground than the traditional claim that emissions trading spurs more innovation than traditional
regulation. It certainly merits further research and exploration. Even if trading turns out to have
some innovation stimulating advantages, trading’s clear inferiority in spurring initially expensive,
but environmentally excellent innovation stands as a significant problem.
Reframing the Debate
One can easily say that emissions trading does stimulate innovation, for it does, at times.
But one can say the same thing about traditional regulation.
This Article has already suggested a more fruitful way of framing the question: Does an
emissions trading scheme produce more innovation than a comparable traditional regulation? An
emissions trading scheme begins with the establishment of limits upon the number of allowances
distributed.153 These limits would form the basis for a traditional performance standard, but for
the option to trade. Convincing analysis should compare a trading program with a traditional
regulation employing equally stringent limits in an equivalent form.
This leads immediately to a recognition of a weakness in existing analysis and a
possibility for improvement. Existing analysis reaches conclusions about innovation by
examining compliance choices of pollution sources subject to trading programs, whether or not
they actually trade. But a pollution source that does not buy or sell credits has innovated or
failed to innovate because of the underlying requirement for reductions, not because of the
incentives provided by trading. Researchers might compare the compliance strategies of
facilities earning extra credits or buying credits that they eventually sell in a trading program to
the strategies of firms subject to the same program rules that opt for local compliance without
trading. The trading sources (both buyers and sellers of credits) should reflect the incentives
trading provides, whereas the non-traders choices should provide some information about how a
performance standard without trading would influence compliance choices.
The Importance of Design
Framing the question of whether trading improves innovation as requiring a comparison
with an identical performance standard without trading yields important insights. Since both
trading and traditional regulation sometimes stimulates innovation and sometimes does not, some
factors besides the choice between trading and traditional regulation must influence the degree of
innovation. This Article has already suggested that the stringency of limits has a large
influence.154 In the Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law, I explain that the form of
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See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 324.
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Cf. Kerr & Newell, supra note 25, at 4 (explaining that stringency induced innovation
in the lead program).
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emission limits matters as well (building on work by Byron Swift on mass-based limits).155 One
would expect that a program with mass-based limits and relatively stringent targets would
produce more innovation than a rate-based program with lax limits, whether or not trading was
used. In spite of widespread recognition that good monitoring is essential to trading, EPA has
allowed states to continue programs that do not feature continuous monitoring. Such programs
tend to produce no innovation and usually fail to produce contemplated environmental
improvements. The literature’s preoccupation with a simplistic and misleading command and
control/economic incentive dichotomy has led to a failure to adequately address crucial design
issues.
Precisely because necessity is the mother of invention, emissions trading probably
produces weaker incentives for innovation than a comparable traditional regulation. And
emissions trading certainly provides inadequate incentives for initially expensive innovations,
even when such innovations offer long-term cost savings and significant and broad
environmental advantages. Design considerations such as stringency and the existence of
adequate monitoring may matter even more than the choice between trading and non-trading
programs.
Implications
The significance of emissions trading’s inferiority in stimulating innovation depends
upon the value of innovation relative to other factors. Emissions trading retains significant cost
saving advantages over traditional regulation, something that regulators will take into account.
My Economic Dynamics book explains why innovation deserves more emphasis than it has
received, especially with respect to environmental problems difficult to reverse.156 Leading
economists agree that the development and spread of new technologies “may, in the long run”
play a major role in determining the “success or failure of environmental protection efforts.”157
The analysis underlying this Article’s conclusion points to the importance of design
factors for both trading and non-trading programs. Design may have more influence upon
environmental performance than the choice between trading and traditional regulation.158
In order to facilitate theoretically broad conclusions, this Article has implicitly assumed
that trading programs are well designed. But often emissions trading programs have not been
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See Swift, supra note 146; <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at

193-197.
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See <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8.
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See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 3, at 49.
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This is at least true where good monitoring is possible. Where it is not possible the
choice of trading over command-and-control regulation is very likely to provide poorer
environmental performance.
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well designed.159 The economic dynamic analysis in this Article points toward the importance of
good design. This Article points out that purchasers of credits will normally prefer the cheapest
possible credits. This means that if any potential exists in a trading system for credits without
fresh real reductions, these credits will tend to dominate the market. For poor quality credits will
cost little or nothing to produce. As in currency, poor quality credits crowd out high quality
credits.160 Hence, good design is essential to stimulating innovation and even to just meeting
basic environmental goals for a program.161
Finally, neither mediocre regulation nor most emissions trading programs do very well in
stimulating radical innovation. They both depend upon government standard setting, which tends
toward demands unlikely to disrupt the status quo. Pollution taxes would suffer from the same
problem.162 Recognizing the weaknesses of trading and other oft-discussed approaches in
stimulating innovation should make us eager to explore more imaginatively the possibilities for
more creative use of economic incentives.
We can design more dynamic economic incentives that encourage competition to reduce
pollution, much as the free market creates competition to provide better amenities. This requires
creation of mechanisms that circumvent the need for repeated government decisions and allow
private actions, rather than government decisions, to stimulate reductions in pollution.
The law can apply either positive economic incentives (revenue increases or cost
decreases) or negative economic incentives (revenue decreases or cost increases) to polluters.
This reveals a possibility that has received too little attention.163 Negative economic incentives
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See EPA, supra note 159.
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See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 <BI>Stan. L. Rev.<D> 607 (2000) (developing a somewhat different
analogy to currency).
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Cf. EPA, supra note 159, at 25 (RECLAIM produced fewer emission reductions than
traditional regulation would have).
162

Cf. Keohane et al., supra note 69, at 348 (explaining that polluters’ preferences have
generally prevented enactment of pollution taxes); James M. Buchanan & Gordon M. Tullock,
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65 <BI>Am. Econ.
Rev.<D> 139, 141-142 (1975) (explaining why polluters oppose pollution taxes); Driesen,
Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 340-343 (describing various impediments to setting tax rates for
pollution).
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It has received some attention. See, e.g., Stewart, Limits, supra note 75, at 12 n.31
(fees from a pollution tax could be used to subsidize pollution reduction); Robert W. Hahn,
Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s
Orders, 3 <BI>J. Econ. Persp.<D> 95, 104-107 (describing effluent taxes dedicated to funding
environmental improvement); <BI>Mikael Skou Andersen, Governance by Green Taxes: Making
Pollution Prevention Pay<D> (1994) (advocating earmarking of green taxes to fund pollution
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can fund positive economic incentives.
Governments have designed programs that use negative economic incentives to fund
positive economic incentives. New Zealand addressed the depletion of its fishery by imposing
fees on fishing (a negative economic incentive) and using revenue from these fees to pay some
fishermen to retire (a positive economic incentive). This may reduce pressure on the fish if fees
are high enough.164 The California legislature has considered a program (called Drive ++) that
involves imposing a fee upon consumers purchasing an energy inefficient or high pollution
vehicle and using the proceeds to fund a rebate on the purchase of an energy efficient vehicle or
low polluting vehicle.165 Similarly, New Hampshire officials have proposed an “Industry Average
Performance System” that redistributes pollution taxes to the polluting industry in ways that
favor lower emissions.166
One can build on this principle to craft laws that mimic the free market’s dynamic
competitive character far better than taxes or subsidies. In a competitive free market, a firm that
innovates to reduce its cost or increase its revenues not only increases its profits, it often reduces
its competitors’ profits. Hence, firms in a very competitive market face strong incentives to
innovate and improve.167 Failing to do so can threaten their survival. Doing so can make them
prosper.
One could craft an “environmental competition statute” that requires polluters to pay any
costs that competitors incur in reducing pollution plus a substantial premium, thereby creating a
significant incentive to be among the first to reduce pollution.168 An environmental competition

reduction).
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T. H. Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment,
<BI>Challenge<D>, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 42, 43.
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See Nathanael Greene & Vanessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives for
Cleaner, More Efficient Vehicles, 12 <BI>Pace Envtl. L. Rev.<D> 91, 94-97 (1994).
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See <BI>New Hampshire Representative Jeffrey C. MacGillivray and Kenneth
Colburn, Director, New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, A New Approach to
Air Pollution Regulation, Industry-Average Performance Systems (IAPS)<D> (1997) (on file
with author).
167

See <BI>Tornatzky & Fleischer<D>, supra note 99, at 168 (intense competition tends
to stimulate spread of innovation).
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I have sketched this idea previously in Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 5, at 344-347
and Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 13, at 10288-10230. The idea receives a fuller
defense in <BI>Driesen, Economic Dynamics<D>, supra note 8, at 151-161, 163, 213. An EPA
economist has recently offered a “feebate” proposal for electric utility that bears some
resemblance to my proposal. See Andrew M. Ballard, Fee/Rebate System May Offer Flexibility in
Reducing Emissions, EPA Economist Tells Conference, 33 <BI>Env’t Rep.<D> (BNA) 1437
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statute directly attacks a fundamental problem with existing free market incentives: The polluting
firm must bear any cleanup costs itself. Since the firm does not experience all of the costs of
pollution itself (most are externalized and felt by the general public), it rarely pays to clean up.169
If firms could systematically externalize the costs of cleanup without substantial administrative
intervention, just as they externalize the cost of pollution, then even a fairly modest premium
might create adequate incentives to control pollution.170
An environmental competition statute would create a private environmental law with a
few public decisions setting up the law, but with substantial enforcement by low polluting
businesses against competitors. The statute would create a private right of action that allowed a
business that realized environmental improvements through investment in pollution reducing (or
low pollution) processes, control devices, products, or services to secure reimbursement for
expenses, plus some premium, from more polluting competitors.171 Hence, the scheme would

(June 28, 2002).
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See <BI>Anderson et. al., Environmental Improvement Through Economic
Incentives<D> 3-4 (1977). For an application of this principle to international environmental law
see David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role In International Environmental Law and Its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 <BI>B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.<D> 287, 306 (1991).
170

The government might still have to decide which pollutants to target. Like other
economic incentive schemes, this one would require developing sufficient data to determine the
relative pollution levels of facilities. The law would work best if it included some mechanism,
such as a requirement that pollution levels be posted regularly on the internet, that made it
possible to see whether a company has performed better than competitors environmentally,
without having to obtain information from government files. Implementing legislation would
also have to determine a common metric for determining relative reductions.
171

The definition of a competitor from whom an environmentally exceptional company
might claim a payment would play an important role in such a statute. EPA traditionally regulates
by grouping industrial processes that share standard industrial classification (SIC) codes and then
creating subgroupings to try and address plants with similar environmental or physical
characteristics. This makes sense for regulation.
But SIC codes do not fully describe competitors in a system designed to reward
environmentally friendly innovation and apply a negative economic incentive to dirtier means of
meeting the same consumer goal. Ideally, somebody who develops a system of integrated pest
management (IPM), for example, that makes it possible to increase beet yield with little or no
pesticides, should be able to collect a payment from pesticide manufacturers that compete with
her to maximize beet yield. Even if the IPM developer operates a research farm and the pesticide
manufacturer operates a pesticide plant, the statute should regard them as competitors (or allow
courts to develop a common law of competition based on broad principles).
Application of an environmental competition statute to a well-defined group of polluters
with very clear definitions tailored to one problem would probably not generate large volumes of
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create economic incentives for some companies to become enforcers of the law, rather than
creating incentives for all companies to resist enforcement.172
Such a proposal overcomes the fundamental problem with traditional regulation,
emissions trading, and taxes. These mechanisms rely on government decisions as the driver for
pollution reductions. An environmental competition statute makes private initiative, motivated
by the prospect of gain and the fear of loss, the driver of environmental improvement, thus
replicating free market dynamics.173 The magnitude of the incentive may depend upon the extent

disputes (but also would produce less widespread environmental improvement). For example,
one could require all electric utilities to pay fees for each ton of nitrogen oxide emissions and
divide the proceeds evenly among the five electric utilities with the lowest rate of nitrogen oxide
emissions at the end of the year 2000. This would be rather simple to administer. Broader
programs would pose more competitor definition issues, but would offer even broader incentives
for innovation and environmental improvement while tending to discourage collusion.
172

Such a law should have a dispute resolution mechanism. Competitor enforcement may
produce more need for conflict resolution. An environmental competition statute may create
conflicts resembling those of other commercial disputes, disputes about what is a competitor,
what costs a company incurred, and what reductions in pollution actually occurred. One may
want to use some fees from polluters to finance specialized arbitration of these disputes.
An environmental competition statute should not generate complicated environmentally
fruitless disputes. The Superfund law makes a variety of parties associated with toxic waste
dumps strictly jointly and severally liable for cleanup. Representatives of companies facing
Superfund liability often complain that this has led to protracted disputes largely because
apportioning liability among potentially responsible parties (PRPs) has proven difficult. See Rena
I Steinzor & Linda E. Greer, In Defense of the Superfund Liability System: Matching the
Diagnosis and the Cure, 27 ELR 10286, 10290 n.19 (1997)
But the principle causes of protracted disputes under Superfund would not exist under an
environmental competition statute. Allocating responsibility has proven difficult under
Superfund because good information about the past history of toxic waste dumps (who dumped,
who allowed dumping, etc.) is hard to come by and the program creates great uncertainty about
the means and scope of eventual cleanup. It will usually not be difficult to figure out who caused
a reduction under an environmental competition statute, since liability will only arise after a
pollution reducing activity is completed and documented.
PRPs and EPA often seek to allocate responsibility under Superfund before completion of
cleanup. This also hinders settlement because the total value of liability remains open-ended at
the time of negotiation. An environmental competition statute should only allow claims based on
already completed cleanup.
173

An environmental competition statute might seem to only create incentives to reduce
first and do nothing to motivate reductions from slow movers. But the dynamic such a program
creates, like the dynamic of a free market, works more broadly than that. Nobody would know a
priori who the first movers would be. This means that anybody who didn’t actively seek
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of industry fears about competitors’ achievements rather than the fixed cost directly imposed by
government.174
Moreover, such a scheme provides a continuous incentive to reduce pollution. Any
company can profit by making an environmental improvement or lose money by failing to make
one.175 The government does need to establish the premium to be paid to first movers. But once it
established this, repeated government decisions are not necessary. Securing maximum incentives
for innovation may require legal structures that induce competition to produce environmental
improvement and lessen the need for repeated government decisions.
Conclusion
Emissions trading certainly does a poor job in stimulating radical innovation. It probably
stimulates less innovation than a comparably designed traditional regulation. As a result, we
should think more critically about the automatic preference for emissions trading. While
policymakers will continue to rely upon emissions trading in the near future,176 we need more
attention to design issues and, in the long run, creative alternatives to emissions trading.

emission reductions would risk financial loss of uncertain dimension, precisely the risk
companies face when they fail to innovate in making new products (or improving old ones) in a
competitive market.
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See, e.g., <BI>Tornatzky & Fleischer<D>, supra note 99, at 86 (describing how firm
research and development expenditures tend to respond to competitive pressures).
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Companies might conclude that they would rather collude to avoid such a scheme than
compete to earn money from it. All of the companies subject to the statute could defeat it by
deciding to do nothing. To prevent this collusion, lawmakers might restrict communication
between companies regarding their plans under the law. Communication about reduction plans
might be considered a combination in restraint of environmental trade and banned on a kind of
antitrust theory. Laws drafted to make it possible for new entrants in markets to compete should
also limit opportunities for collusion.
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See, e.g., ‘Clear Skies’ Legislation to Cut Emissions from Power Plants Introduced in
Congress, 33 <BI>Env’t Rep.<D> (BNA) 1693, 1694 (Aug. 2, 2002) (both Jefford’s bill and
Bush Administration’s Clear Skies proposal rely upon a cap and trade approach, says
Holmstead).
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